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Abstract
I explore the idea of simplicity as a belief-selection criterion in
games. A pair of strategies in ﬁnite-automata representation (s1,s 2)
is a “Simple Nash Equilibrium” (SINE) if: (1) sj is a best-reply to
si ; (2) every automaton for player j, which generates the same path
as sj (given si), has at least as many states as sj. I apply SINE to
a bilateral concession game and show that it captures an aspect of
bargaining behavior: players employ delay tactics in order to justify
their concessions. Delay tactics are mutually reinforcing, and this may
prevent players from reaching an interior agreement.
∗I am deeply grateful to the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton for its stimulat-
ing hospitality. I also thank Eddie Dekel, Kﬁr Eliaz, Michele Piccione, Ariel Rubinstein,
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
The idea that complexity considerations may aﬀect players’ choice of strategy
has become entrenched in the game-theoretic literature, following Rubinstein
(1986), Abreu and Rubinstein (1988), Banks and Sundaram (1990), Piccione
(1992), Chatterjee and Sabourian (2000) and others. The assumption un-
derlying these works is that complex strategies are more costly to implement
than simple strategies.
By comparison, the analogous idea of complexity as a criterion for belief
selection in games has been virtually unexplored. Preference for simple the-
ories is of course an ancient philosophical notion. Usually it is applied to
the exalted realm of scientiﬁc inquiry, but there is no reason why it should
not be relevant to the more mundane business of playing games. One way
to implement this idea in the context of two-person games is to assume that
among the entire set of beliefs that are consistent with a player’s observed
behavior, only the simplest ones will be considered by his opponent.
Simplicity is a particularly natural belief-selection criterion when player
have justify his behavior to other people. Imagine a “post-mortem” that
takes place at the end of the game. Each player is required to explain his
behavior to his own audience, which has observed the play path but does
not know the opponent’s strategy. The explanation consists of a belief -
i.e., a strategy ascribed to the opponent - and an explanation of the player’s
response to this belief. When arguments based on common knowledge of
rationality are incapable of selecting beliefs, simplicity appears to be a natural
selection criterion.
In order to capture this consideration, I introduce a solution concept,
called Simple Nash Equilibrium (SINE), for two-person, complete-information
games. Restrict attention to pure strategies having a machine (ﬁnite au-
tomata) representation. A machine proﬁle (s1,s 2) is a SINE if: (1) si is a
best-reply to sj;a n d( 2 )sj is among the least complex strategies for player
j that are consistent with the play path induced by (s1,s 2). As has become
customary in the literature, the complexity of a machine is quantiﬁed by the
number its states.
In this paper, I apply SINE to the following game. Two players move
alternately. Each player at his turn decides whether or not to make a con-
cession. The game is terminated in agreement if the cumulative number of
concessions reaches some N>1. I also study an inﬁnite-horizon version of
the game. Players (weakly) prefer any agreement to disagreement. Condi-
2tional on agreement, they strictly prefer to make fewer concessions. I abstract
from time preferences; players care only about the concession ratio. In the
game’s inﬁnite-horizon version, each player tries to maximize the limit pro-
portion of concessions made by his opponent. I refer to this interaction as a
concession game.
The concession game is quite uninteresting under Nash and subgame per-
fect equilibrium: every agreement can be sustained in equilibrium. In con-
trast, the concept of SINE can lead to drastic reduction in the set of equilibria.
In Section 3, I analyze the simple case of N =2as an illustrative exercise
and show that there exists no SINE that sustains the interior agreement. In
Section 4, I provide two characterization results for the inﬁnite-horizon case.
First, under a mild condition, which is closely linked to the “discount robust-
ness” condition due to Kalai and Stanford (1988), no interior agreement is
sustainable by a cyclic SINE. Second, if players themselves had a preference
for simple (consistent) beliefs, any cyclic SINE which sustains an interior
agreement, would be unstable w.r.t this preference. Thus, a taste for simple
beliefs, which is shared by the players and their audiences alike, destabilizes
any cyclic Nash equilibrium that sustains an interior agreement.
Ia n a l y z et h ec a s eo f2 <N<∞ in Section 5. This case is more complex
to analyze. Therefore, I impose some structure on equilibrium machines: if
a state q can be reached from another state r,t h e nr cannot be reached from
q. I refer to machines that satisfy this condition as “linear”. This restriction
is innocuous under Nash equilibrium: every agreement can be sustained in
Nash equilibrium with linear machines. In contrast, there exists no SINE
with linear machines that sustains an interior agreement.
The main point of these results is that the pressure to justify concessions
can destabilize interior agreements.I nS I N E ,aP l a y e rj u s t i ﬁes his strategy
as a best-reply to a simple, consistent belief of his opponent’s strategy. To
achieve this goal, the player may have to delay his concessions, and the
required amount of delay is increasing in the amount of delay exerted by this
opponent. Roughly speaking, if player i delays one of his concessions by K
periods, then player j will have to delay his concessions by K +1periods.
Thus, the “delay tactics” that result from the pressure to justify concessions
are mutually reinforcing. Ultimately, they may prevent the players from
reaching an interior agreement.
In general, I believe that the idea of simplicity as a belief-selection cri-
terion can be instrumental in understanding the phenomenon of delay in
bargaining interactions. Developing this idea is left for future work.
3Related literature
This paper is linked to several strands in the literature. The strongest
link is with Abreu and Rubinstein (1988). Complexity considerations play
subtly diﬀerent roles in the two papers. A detailed comparison is conducted
in Section 6.
The idea of simplicity as a belief-selection criterion has been studied in
two recent works. SINE is a special case of the concept of Equilibrium in
Justiﬁable Strategies (EJS), developed in Spiegler (2002). Whereas SINE
requires players to optimize against simple consistent beliefs, EJS allows
them to depart from best-replying. The concept of EJS will be introduced
in Section 6, in the context of concession games with costly delay.
Eliaz (2001) constructs a related solution concept, called “Nash Equilib-
rium with Stable Forecasts” (ESF). A pair of machines (s1,s 2) is an ESF if:
(1) si is a best-reply to sj ;( 2 )t h e r ee x i s t sn os0
j ∈ Sj that is simpler than
sj, such that si is a best-reply to s0
j.I no t h e rw o r d s ,sj must be the simplest
belief that rationalizes si. (However, the destabilizing belief s0
j need not be
consistent with the play path.) Thus, in SINE, sj is not a stable belief if
there is a simpler belief that is consistent with player j’s behavior along the
play path, whereas in ESF, sj is not a stable belief if there is a simpler belief
that rationalizes s−j.
Finally, Maenner (2001) uses simplicity as belief-selection criterion within
a learning procedure, rather than for equilibrium reﬁnement purposes.
2 The Model
Two players play the following complete-information, multi-period game,
dubbed “the concession game”. Player 1 moves at odd periods and player 2
moves at even periods. Each player at his turn decides between two actions,
“concede” (C) and “do not concede” (D). I sometimes refer to C and D
as “soft” and “tough”. The action taken at period k of some play path is
denoted ak ∈ {C,D}.
Let N>1 be some ﬁnite integer. The case of inﬁnite N is considered
in Section 4. The set of terminal histories (play paths) consists of agreement
paths, in which the total number of concessions is equal to N,a n ddisagree-
ment paths, in which the total number of concessions is smaller than N.I n
agreement paths, x1 ∈ {0, 1
N, 2
N,...,1} is the concession ratio in the game -
4i.e., the proportion of player 2’s concessions out of the total number of con-
cessions. In disagreement paths, x1 = x2 =0 . Player j’s sole objective is
to maximize xj. I abstract from time preferences: players are indiﬀerent to
delay. The case of costly delay is dealt with in Section 6.
My favorite interpretation of the concession game is as a model of bar-
gaining over an agenda consisting of N binary issues. The agenda is ﬁxed:
players have to resolve one issue before they can proceed to the next issue.
When discussing strategies, I will restrict attention to pure strategies
that can be represented by a machine (Q,q0,f,τ),w h e r eQ is a ﬁnite set
of states; q0 is the initial state; f : Q → {C,D} is an output function,
which speciﬁes the action taken by the player when he is in state q ∈ Q;
and τ : Q ×{ C,D} → Q is a transition function, which speciﬁes the state
to which the machine switches from state q ∈ Q when the opponent plays
a ∈ {C,D} against q.
A bit of extra terminology and notation will be useful:
• When f(q)=a, q is called an a-state.
• For any q,r ∈ Q,w es a yt h a tr can be reached from q if there exists a
sequence of states q1,...,qm ∈ Q and a sequence of actions a1,...,am−1 ∈
{C,D}, such that q1 = q, qm = r,a n df o re v e r yk =1 ,...,m − 1,
τ(qk,a k)=qk+1.
• The path induced by a machine proﬁle (s1,s 2) is denoted z(s1,s 2).
• The machine state of the player who moves at period k in z(s1,s 2) is
denoted p(k).N o t et h a tp(1) = q0
1 and p(2) = τ2(q0
2,a 1).
• A state q ∈ Qi is visited in z(s1,s 2) if p(t)=q for some period t in
z(s1,s 2).
• A machine proﬁle (s1,s 2) sustains an interior agreement if each player
makes at least one concession along the induced path.
The restriction to machines entails no loss of generality: every play path
in the concession game can be generated by a pair of machines. In particular,
5every agreement x1 ∈ {0, 1
N,...,1} is sustainable by some pair of strategies
with a machine representation, which constitutes a Nash equilibrium.1
The machine representation enables us to formalize complexity consider-
ations. Following common practice, the complexity of a machine is measured
by number of its states.Am a c h i n eb for player j is consistent with (s1,s 2)
if z(si,b)=z(s1,s 2).L e t Bj(s1,s 2) be the set of simplest consistent ma-
chines for player j,g i v e nz(s1,s 2).T h a ti s ,b ∈ Bj(s1,s 2) if b is consistent
with z(s1,s 2) and every other machine for player j, which is consistent with
z(s1,s 2), has at least as many states as b.
Deﬁnition 1 A pair of machines (s1,s 2) is a Simple Nash Equilibrium
(SINE) if for every j =1 ,2, i 6= j:
1. si is a best-reply to sj.
2. sj ∈ Bj(s1,s 2)
I adhere to the tradition of interpreting equilibrium strategies as beliefs -
i.e., sj is player i’s belief of player j’s strategy, where the belief is cast in the
form of a machine. Under this interpretation, the concept of SINE captures
the idea that in equilibrium, it is not enough for player i’s belief to be correct
- it also has to be simple. There should exist no belief of player j’s strategy,
which is simpler than sj and consistent with z(s1,s 2).
The concession ratios x1 =1and x1 =0are SINE-sustainable for every
N. First, the strategies “always D” and “always C” are best-replies to
each other, hence they satisfy the ﬁr s tp a r to fD e ﬁnition 1. Second, both
strategies have a single-state machine representation, hence they satisfy the
second part of Deﬁnition 1. Of course, we are more interested in the SINE-
sustainability of interior agreements. This will be the subject-matter of the
following sections.
1E.g., player j’s concessions can be rationalized by a “grim” threat by his opponent -
namely, that player i will stop making further concessions unless player j concedes ﬁrst.
The same holds for subgame perfect equilibrium, under a modiﬁcation of the machine
formalism, which allows players to condition on their own past moves.
63T h e C a s e o f N =2
Studying the simple case of N =2ﬁrst will be useful for illustrating the eﬀect
of simplicity as a belief-selection criterion on the sustainability of interior
agreements in the concession game.
Proposition 1 There exists no SINE that sustains the agreement x1 = 1
2.
Proof. Assume the contrary and let (s1,s 2) be a SINE sustaining the
agreement x1 = 1
2. Each player plays C exactly once along the equilibrium
path. If player i never plays D along the play path, then Bi(s1,s 2) consists
of a single machine, consisting of a single C-state. Against this machine,
player j’s concession is sub-optimal, a contradiction. Therefore, each player
has to play D at least once in z(s1,s 2). It follows that each player’s machine
contains at least one D-state and one C-state.
Let Ki ∈ {0,1,2,...} denote the number of consecutive periods, in which
both players play D just before player i makes his concession. (E.g., in the
play path given in the example below this proof, K1 = K2 =4 .) W.l.o.g.,
Ki ≥ Kj. During these Ki periods, no state q ∈ Qi can be visited more than
once. Assume the contrary. Then, there exists a sequence of states (q1,...,qm)
in Qi,s u c ht h a t :q1 = qm = q,a n dfi(qk)=D and τi(qk,D)=qk+1 for every
k =1 ,...,m − 1. However, this contradicts the fact, evident from the play
path, that if player j starts playing D repeatedly when player i’s machine
is in q,p l a y e ri’s machine eventually reaches a C-state. It follows that no
state in Qi is visited more than once during the Ki periods that immediately
precede player i’s concession. Let M denote the number of times that player
i plays D during these Ki periods. (M is equal to
Ki
2 , rounded either up
or down.) Thus, player i’s machine contains at least one C-state and M
D-states, such that |Qi| ≥ M +1 .
Let us establish that every member in Bi(s1,s 2) contains exactly M +1
states. We shall do this by constructing a machine for player i consisting
of M +1states, which is consistent with z(s1,s 2). Let us carry out the
construction for the case of i =2 . (The construction for the case of i =1
is virtually identical and therefore omitted, for the sake of brevity.) Let
Q2 = {q0,...,qM}; the initial state is q0;l e tf2(q0)=C and f2(qk)=D for
every k 6=0 ; ﬁnally, let τ2(qk,D)=qk+1modM+1 and τ2(qk,C)=q1 for every
7k =0 ,...,M. This machine is consistent with z(s1,s 2) because K2 ≥ K1.2
It remains to show that facing any machine for player i,w h i c hi sc o n s i s t e n t
with z(s1,s 2) and contains exactly M +1states, player j’s concession is sub-
optimal. If |Qi| = M +1 ,t h e ne v e r yD-state in player i’s machine is visited
during the Ki periods that immediately precede his concession. According to
the play path, if player j starts playing D repeatedly when player i’s machine
is in any of these D-states, player i eventually makes a concession. Thus,
given player i’s machine, player j could have enforced the outcome xj =1
instead of xj = 1
2,h e n c esi is not a best reply to sj,ac o n t r a d i c t i o n .





Player 1 needs to justify his concession at period 5 as part of a best reply
to player 2’s strategy. One way to do this is to argue that if he had not made
that ﬁrst concession, player 2 would never have conceded and there would
have been no agreement. Figure 1 represents a belief of player 2’s strategy,
w h i c hi sc o n s i s t e n tw i t hs u c haj u s t i ﬁcation:
 
D D D C
D
C
q   
r 
Figure 1
2E.g., in the play path given in the example below this proof, M =2 .T h er e a d e rc a n
verify that the machine given by Figure 2 matches the general construction just given.
8However, s2 is not a simplest consistent belief of player 2’s strategy, given
the play path: the machine given by Figure 2 consists of fewer states:
  






Note that if player 1 faced the machine represented by Figure 2, it would
not be optimal for him to make any concession. In general, as long as player
1 fails to delay his concession longer than player 2 delays his own concession,
no simplest consistent machine for player 2 can justify player 1’s concession.
The only way for player 1 to justify his concession is by delaying it longer
than player 2 does. Only by doing so, will he be able to justify his concession
as optimal against a simplest consistent belief of player 2’s strategy. Clearly,
this kind of delay tactics is mutually reinforcing. The more player 1 delays
his concession, the more player 2 will need to delay his own concession in
order to justify it. As a result, the interior agreement cannot be sustained.
The complexity considerations leading to the players’ delay tactics cap-
ture the following intuition. The longer the delay between two concessions,
the weaker the perceived causal link between them. In other words, as player
1’s concession becomes more distant in time than player 2’s concession, the
claim that former was the cause of the latter is less persuasive. It is not
player 1’s concession, but rather his subsequent tough play that appears to
have caused player 2 to concede. In order to persuade his audience that his
concession was necessary, player 1 needs to make the delay between the two
concessions appear short relative to the total duration of the game. Hence
player 1’s motive to delay his concession longer than player 2 delays his own
concession.
94A n I n ﬁnite-Horizon Concession Game
In this section, I study an inﬁnite-horizon version of the concession game.
This is a bargaining model, in which the two parties ﬁght over an indeﬁnite
number of binary issues. This description especially ﬁts situations of rela-
tional bargaining. The lack of a ﬁnite horizon allows us to obtain rich results
because there are no end-game eﬀects that complicate the analysis.
Of course, we need to redeﬁne the payoﬀs. Given a machine proﬁle (s1,s 2),
deﬁne Xi(t) as the cumulative number of concessions made by player j by






for both i =1 ,2. For agreement paths, the limit is strictly positive for at





These limits are well-deﬁned because any proﬁle of ﬁnite automata eventually
enters a cycle. The cycle in a disagreement path consists of nothing but D’s.
The cycle of an agreement path contains at least one C. We will say that
an agreement path induces an interior agreement if xi > 0 for both i =1 ,2.
Note that in any agreement path, x1 + x2 =1 . Assume that players care
only about the limit concession ratio. That is, player j’s sole objective is to
maximize xj.
A pair of machines (s1,s 2) is cyclic if there exists an integer L,s u c ht h a t
for every player j and every period t ≥ 1, pj(t)=pj(t + L).T h a t i s , t h e
cyclic phase of the play path begins right at the beginning of the game. One
motivation for studying cyclic equilibria is that the player’s audience may
have bounded recall. The audience cannot survey the entire play path, but
only some backward truncation of it.
Given a machine sj for player j,d e ﬁne Vi(q,a) as the maximal payoﬀ
that player i can obtain using a strategy that always plays a ∈ {C,D} when
si is in q ∈ Qj. For example, when player 2’s machine is given by Figure
1, V1(q,D)=0 , V1(q,C)=1
2,w h e r e a sV1(q0,D)=1
2 and V1(q0,C)=1
3 for
every other state q0 ∈ Q2.
10Deﬁnition 2 A pair of machines (s1,s 2) satisﬁes “No Redundant Threats”
(NRT) if for every i =1 ,2, j 6= i, and every q ∈ Qj, τj(q,C) 6= τj(q,D)
implies Vi(q,C) 6= Vi(q,D).
The NRT property means that if playing C and D against a state q
leads to diﬀerent continuations, then the player cannot be indiﬀerent between
always playing C against q and always playing D against q. That is, all the
threats in players’ machines have to be payoﬀ-relevant. The machines given
by Figures 1 and 2 satisfy the NRT property, whereas the machine given by
Figure 3 violates it: playing C or D against q leads to diﬀerent continuations,













In a repeated game with discounting, the NRT property is equivalent
to the “discount robustness” condition due to Kalai and Stanford (1988).
Basically, NRT and discount robustness are conditions that can be used in
order to rule out equilibria that crucially rely on ties.
The NRT property is innocuous under Nash or subgame perfect equilib-
rium. Every concession ratio x1 ∈ [0,1] in the inﬁnite-horizon concession
game can be approximated by a Nash equilibrium that is implemented by a
machine proﬁle satisfying NRT.
3The box kD (k =4 ,5)m e a n st h a tkD -states machine are serially connected by a
constant transition - i.e., the machine plays D for k times in a row, independently of the
opponent’s moves.
11Proposition 2 T h e r ee x i s t sn oc y c l i cS I N Et h a ts a t i s ﬁes the NRT property
and sustains an interior agreement.
The reasoning behind this result consists of two stages. The ﬁrst stage
establishes that in any cyclic SINE satisfying NRT, each player makes at least
one concession (per cycle), which he justiﬁes by the claim that otherwise,
the opponent would have stayed in the same D-state indeﬁnitely. In other
words, each player plays C at least once against a “stalemate” - i.e., a state
q satisfying fj(q)=D and τj(q,D)=q. The second stage is similar to
the proof of Proposition 1. Players justify concessions by delaying them.
Their delay tactics are mutually reinforcing, such that an interior agreement
is unsustainable: there will always be at least one player, who wishes he had
delayed his concessions longer.
Once the NRT property is relaxed, it becomes possible to sustain interior
agreements in SINE. E.g., when both players play the machine given by
Figure 3 (except that the initial state in the machine of one of the players is
adjusted), a cyclic SINE is obtained. The cycle is a succession of four chunks
of the following form: player 1 makes a concession after d1 periods, then
player 2 makes a concession after d2 periods, where d1,d 2 ∈ {4,5}. The cycle
contains all four combinations of (d1,d 2). The players’ indiﬀerence between
delaying concessions by four or ﬁve periods allows a relatively irregular cycle
to be generated from relatively simple machines.
This SINE has an interesting property. Player 1, say, is able to deviate to
another strategy s0
1, which prescribes only D against q and attains the same
payoﬀ as s1. Several states in s2 remain unvisited along z(s0
1,s 2). Therefore,
player 1 can justify s0










12In other words, player 1 can deviate to a strategy, which he can justify as
a best-reply to a belief, which is both simpler than s2 and consistent with the
path resulting from player 1’s deviation. Furthermore, player 1 can achieve
this without compromising optimal response to s2. This turns out to be a
general property.
Proposition 3 Suppose that (s1,s 2) is a cyclic SINE that sustains an inte-





j is a best-reply to si and s0
i.
2. s0
i is consistent with z(si,s 0
j).
3. s0
i is simpler than si.
What is the meaning of this result? Recall that SINE captures the idea
that complex beliefs are inadmissible when a player tries to justify his behav-
ior before an audience. We might say that the concept reﬂects the audience’s
preference for simple beliefs. Alternatively, we could be interested in situ-
ations, in which it is the player himself who prefers to justify his behavior
with simple beliefs. One rationale behind such a preference is that complex
beliefs have a greater chance of being misunderstood by the player’s audience.
Given this preference, a player has a motive to deviate if he can keep opti-
mizing against the opponent’s true strategy, while reducing the complexity
of the (consistent) belief that he uses to rationalize his behavior.4
Proposition 3 shows that there is a clash between these two types of
preference for simple beliefs: the player’s and his audience’s. If a cyclic Nash
equilibrium sustaining an interior agreement is robust w.r.t the audience’s
preference for simple consistent beliefs, then it is not robust w.r.t the player’s
preference for simple consistent beliefs, and vice versa.
In the example that motivates Proposition 3, player 1’s deviation clearly
satisﬁes all three conditions of the proposition. When player 1 stops playing
4In Eliaz (2001), players have a preference for simple beliefs. The diﬀerence is that
in Eliaz (2001), the simpler belief need not be consistent with the play path: a simpler
rationalizing belief is always favored, whether or not it is consistent with the play path.
13C against q, the whole “right-hand side” of player 2’s machine is never visited.
Therefore, it is possible to obtain a simpler machine for player 2, which
would be consistent with the path induced by player 1’s deviation, as Figure
4 illustrates. The main diﬃculties in proving Proposition 3 arise when such
a deviation is unavailable - i.e., when the set of states in player j’s machine,
which are visited along the play path, does not change when player i deviates
to a strategy that avoids playing C against some state q ∈ Qj.
Propositions 2 and 3 characterize the set of cyclic SINE in the inﬁnite-
horizon concession game. The restriction to cyclic equilibria is important
for the results of this section. Typically, manipulating Bj(s1,s 2) has payoﬀ-
relevant consequences for player i. However, in cyclic equilibria, there is a
single exception: if player i changes the number of times that he plays D
against a state q ∈ Qj satisfying fj(q)=D and τj(q,D)=q,h em a ya ﬀect
Bj(s1,s 2) without aﬀecting the limit concession ratio. This feature is crucial
for the proofs of Propositions 2 and 3. (In particular, see Claim 3 in the proof
of Proposition 2.) In contrast, when z(s1,s 2) has an introductory phase,
player i can also use his behavior in that phase to manipulate Bj(s1,s 2),
without aﬀecting the limit concession ratio. This makes the characterization
of such equilibria considerably more diﬃcult.
5T h e C a s e o f 2 <N<∞
In the proof of both Propositions 1 and 2, a crucial property is that player
j plays a unique action in equilibrium against q ∈ Qi, except possibly when
q is what I referred to as a “stalemate”. This is no longer the case when
2 <N<∞. For example, suppose that s1 contains an absorbing D-state,
which is reached after N − k concessions have been made. Then, player 2
has to make the k last concessions in the game, but he can intersperse these
concessions with a number of D’s, without sacriﬁcing optimality. Contrary
to the case of N = ∞, an auxiliary condition such as NRT is nonsensical
because the function V (q,·) is ill-deﬁned.
The possibility of playing both softly and toughly against states other
than stalemates complicates analysis considerably. Therefore, in this section
I impose some structure on equilibrium machines.
14Deﬁnition 3 A machine s =( Q,q0,f,τ) is linear if for every two distinct
states q,r ∈ Q,i fr can be reached from q ∈ Q,t h e nq cannot be reached
from r.
Linearity means that the machine contains no cycles. Once a state is
“abandoned”, it can never be visited again. Note, however, that linearity
allows τ(q,a)=q for some a ∈ {C,D}. The restriction to linear machines
entails no loss of generality under Nash equilibrium. Every agreement x ∈
{0, 1
N,...,1} can be sustained by a Nash equilibrium with linear machines.
For example, the pair of linear machines given by Figure 5 constitutes a









Player  1: D C D D D … 
Player 2:         D        C          C         C         C      … 
Figure 5
This, however, is not a SINE because s1 is not the simplest machine that
can generate player 1’s behavior. A machine consisting of a single C-state
qC and a single D-state qD satisfying τ(qD,C)=qD and τ(qD,D)=qC
generates the same path.
The chief attraction of linear machines is that they are easy to construct
as an explanation for a given play path, because whenever pi(t +2 )6= pi(t),
pi(t) is never revisited after period t. In other respects, linearity is a strong
restriction. In particular, given a particular play path, the simplest consistent
linear machine for a player may contain many more states than the simplest
consistent machine in the unrestricted domain.
15Proposition 4 There exists no SINE with linear machines that sustains an
interior agreement x1 ∈ { 1
N,..., N−1
N }.
Thus, a class of machines that suﬃces to sustain any interior agreement
under Nash equilibrium turns out to be incapable of sustaining interior agree-
ments under SINE. From a technical point of view, what makes the proof go
through is the fact that in linear machines, a state q ∈ Qi is visited more
than once only if it τi(q,a)=q for some a ∈ {C,D}. This is the only kind
of states in player i’s machine, against which player j might play more than
just one action along the equilibrium path. This allows us to use the same
kind of reasoning used in previous results. Other restrictions on the domain
of permissible machines leading to the same property would imply the same
impossibility result.5
As mentioned earlier, linear machines are attractive because of their ease
of construction as an explanation for a given play path. Proposition 4 shows
that in order to sustain an interior agreement in SINE, the players’ machines
have to be non-linear. In this respect, if an interior agreement can be sus-
tained in equilibrium, then equilibrium strategies must be hard to construct.
The restriction to linear machines plays the same role in the analysis of
SINE in the case of 2 <N<∞ a st h eN R Tp r o p e r t yi nt h ec a s eo fN = ∞.
Each restriction in its case implies the property that player j plays a unique
action against any state in player i’s machine, except for states having a
particular structure.
6 Comparison with Abreu-Rubinstein (1988)
The concept of SINE bears a close formal resemblance to the model of Abreu
and Rubinstein (1988) - AR henceforth. The cornerstone of AR is the
assumption that players prefer simpler strategies. That is, complexity con-
siderations are applied to strategies, rather than beliefs. The special case, in
which complexity costs are lexicographically secondary to “regular” payoﬀs,
is of particular relevance to the present paper.
5Note that when N = ∞, the restriction to linear machines is trivial, as it immediately
implies a limit concession ratio of 0 or 1, independently of equilibrium arguments.
16Deﬁnition 4 A pair of machines (s1,s 2) is an AR-equilibrium if for every
j =1 ,2, i 6= j:
1. si is a best-reply to sj.
2. There exists no machine s0
i, which is a best-reply to sj and has fewer
states than si.
Remark 1 Every AR-equilibrium is a SINE.
The proof is trivial. If there exists no strategy s0
i, which is simpler than si
and generates the same payoﬀ for player i,g i v e nsj, then clearly there exists
no strategy s0
i, which is simpler than si and generates the same path as si,
given sj. Remark 1 holds for every game and every measure of complexity.
The concept of AR-equilibrium was originally conceived in the context
of two-person, inﬁnitely repeated games with discounting. In this class of
g a m e s ,ac o n v e r s er e s u l tt oR e m a r k1h o l d s .
Remark 2 Every SINE in a two-person, inﬁnitely repeated game with dis-
counting, which satisﬁes NRT, is also an AR-equilibrium.
Once again, the proof is simple. Let (s1,s 2) be a SINE. By the discounting
assumption, a is played against q ∈ Qj if and only if a ∈ argmaxVi(q,·).B y
NRT, argmaxVi(q,·) is a singleton for every q ∈ Qj. Therefore, no other path
generates the same payoﬀ for player i as z(s1,s 2),g i v e nsj.B yd e ﬁnition of
SINE, it is impossible to generate z(s1,s 2) with simpler machines. It follows
that (s1,s 2) is an AR-equilibrium.
In the concession game, Remark 2 is not true. For instance, consider
the following pair of machines. Player 1’s machine s1 consists of a single
D-state. Player 2’s machine s2 is: Q2 = {qC,qD}, q0
2 = qC, f2(qC)=C,
f2(qD)=D, τ2(qC,·)=qD, τ2(qD,·)=qC. On one hand, (s1,s 2) is a SINE.
Along z(s1,s 2),p l a y e r1a l w a y sp l a y sD, whereas player 2 plays both C and
D.S i n c e s1 is a single-state machine, B1(s1,s 2)={s1}.A s t o p l a y e r 2 ,
his machine consists of a single C-state and a single D-state, hence it is
impossible to reduce the number of states in his machine without violating
consistency with the play path. On the other hand, (s1,s 2) is not an AR-
equilibrium. A machine for player 2, which consists of a single C-state has
17fewer states than s2, yet it induced the same concession ratio. Thus, SINE
and AR-equilibrium diverge in the concession game.
An immediate implication of Remark 1 is that any impossibility result
proved for SINE carries over to AR-equilibrium as well. At least in the case
of N = ∞, a general impossibility result that interior agreements cannot
be sustained in AR-equilibrium is provable, using methods borrowed from
Piccione (1992) and Piccione and Rubinstein (1993).
However, it should be emphasized that although the results are similar,
the reasoning that leads to them is quite diﬀerent under the two concepts.
Put succinctly, SINE implies a motive to delay concessions, whereas AR-
equilibrium implies a motive to hasten concessions. Consider the case of
N =2 , for instance. In Section 3, we saw that when player 2 plays the
machine given by Figure 1, SINE implies that player 1 delays his concession
by at least three periods. In contrast, AR-equilibrium implies that player 1
should not delay his concession at all, but rather play C at period 3,a ss o o n
as player 2 reaches state q,a st h i sw o u l ds a v eu n n e c e s s a r yD-states in player
1’s machine.
As a further illustration, consider a simultaneous-move v e r s i o no ft h e
inﬁnite-horizon concession game. Suppose that both players play the machine
g i v e nb yF i g u r e1 ,w i t ho n em o d i ﬁcation: player 2’s initial state is r instead
of q. This machine proﬁle is a SINE, yet it does not constitute an AR-
equilibrium. This example demonstrates not only the diﬀerence between the
two concepts, but also the role of alternating moves in this paper.
To sum up, the concepts of SINE and AR-equilibrium are formally simi-
lar. However, in the concession game they imply diﬀerent kinds of reasoning.
The need to optimize with the simplest possible machine impels players to
avoid delay, whereas the need to render the opponent’s machine a simple,
consistent belief impels them to exert delay.
7C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
Participants in bargaining interactions often want to justify the concessions
that they make along the way. One common way of ensuring the justiﬁability
o fac o n c e s s i o ni st od e l a yi t .A f t e ras u ﬃcient amount of delay, the conces-
sion appears to be necessary in order to break away from a stalemate. This
i n t u i t i o ni sc a p t u r e di nt h i sp a p e r :d e l a yt a c t i c se m e r g ea sa ni m p l i c a t i o n
of SINE. Players resort to delay tactics because it helps them establish the
18opponent’s strategy as a simple, consistent belief. The mutually reinforcing
aspect of this kind of delay tactics may prevent players from reaching an
interior agreement. This is one of the main points of this paper: applying
complexity considerations to beliefs can be useful in understanding bargain-
ing behavior.
The reader should be reminded that delay does not emerge as an equilib-
rium phenomenon in the characterization results. What these results show
is that interior agreements may be unstable because of delay tactics origi-
nating from justiﬁability considerations - not that delay itself is stable. It
certainly cannot be said that this paper “explains” the phenomenon of delay
in bargaining.
One element of bargaining, which is absent from the concession game is
time preferences: players are assumed to be indiﬀerent to delay. Alterna-
tively, consider the case of N =2 , and suppose that players’ payoﬀsa r e
strictly decreasing in the duration of the game. Then, the following simple
result holds:
Remark 3 Suppose that given si, the maximal concession ratio that player
j can attain is xj = 1
2. Then, there exists no machine sj for player j,s u c h
that sj is a best-reply to si and si ∈ Bi(s1,s 2).
The proof is simple. If player j has to make a concession in order to
squeeze a concession from player i, this must be due to some threat of player
i. When delay is costly, player j cannot realize this threat without sacriﬁcing
optimality. But if player j does not realize the threat, this means that certain
states in Qi are not visited in the play path. Hence, si is not a simplest
consistent machine for player i.
It follows that when delay is costly, the impossibility of sustaining the
interior agreement in SINE holds trivially. The tension between simple beliefs
and optimal response is not an equilibrium phenomenon: it already arises at
the level of individual behavior.
In Spiegler (2002), I argue that if sacriﬁcing optimality is necessary for
the player’s belief to be convincing in the eyes of his audience, then a proper
notion of justiﬁability should take this into account. In Spiegler (2002), the
game’s “post-mortem” is viewed as a debate, in which arguments and counter
arguments are exchanged between the player and his audience.
19Deﬁnition 5 A machine si is justiﬁable against sj if:
1. sj ∈ Bj(si,s j)
2. For every proﬁtable deviation s0
i for player i, and every belief b ∈
Bj(s0
i,s j), si does better than s0
i against b.
Deﬁnition 5 captures the following “post-mortem”. Player i’s audience
accepts only a simple, consistent belief of player j’s strategy. Suppose that
sj is an admissible belief, but si is not an optimal response to sj.P l a y e ri’s
audience raises the criticism that an alternative machine s0
i would have done
better than si against sj. Suppose that player i can counter-argue that had
he played s0
i,h ew o u l dh a v eb e e ns u bj e c t e dt ot h es a m ek i n do fc r i t i c i s m ,o n l y
in the opposite direction: si is better than s0
i against every admissible belief
given the path induced by (s0
i,s j). This is a “smashing” counter-argument
because it shows that the audience’s criticism is self-defeating: if the player
had accepted the criticism, he would have still been exposed to it. If player
i can counter-argue in this way against every criticism of his audience, his
machine is justiﬁable against sj.W e s a y t h a t (s1,s 2) is an Equilibrium in
Justiﬁable Strategies (EJS) if s1 is justiﬁable against s2, and vice versa. The
concept of SINE is a special case of EJS: Every SINE is an EJS.
Justiﬁability allows a player to play sub-optimally if he can defend his
departure from best-replying with the right counter-argument. Turning back
to the case of N =2 ,I tc a nb es h o w nt h a ti ft h ec o s to fd e l a yi ss u ﬃciently
small and player 2’s machine s2 is given by Figure 1, there exists a machine
s1 for player 1, which is justiﬁable against s2. Player 1 attains justiﬁability
in the same way as in Section 3: he delays his concession for three periods.
No EJS sustains the interior agreement in the case of N =2 .T h ep r o o f
shares many features with the proof of Proposition 1: players attain justiﬁ-
ability through delay tactics, but such tactics are mutually reinforcing, such
that in equilibrium there is always at least one player who wishes he had
delayed his concession longer. Working out the fuller implications of justiﬁ-
ability for bargaining behavior under costly delay is left for future research.
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9 Appendix: Proofs
Deﬁne q as a “stalemate”i ff(q)=D and τ(q,D)=q. We will say that action
a is played against a state q ∈ Qi if there exists a period t along z(s1,s 2),
such that pi(t − 1) = q and at = a.L e tAj(q) denote the set of actions that
21player j plays against q ∈ Qi. Note that the proofs of Propositions 3 and 4
rely on the proof of Proposition 2.
9.1 Proposition 2
The proof proceeds step-wise. Suppose that (s1,s 2) is a cyclic SINE satisfying
the NRT property.
Claim 1 Each player plays both C and D in equilibrium.
Proof. If player i plays only D in z(s1,s 2), then the play path does not
induce an interior agreement, a contradiction. If player i plays only C,t h e na
machine consisting of a single C-state is consistent with his behavior. This is
the unique simplest machine for player i. Against this machine, the optimal
response for player j is to play always D. This does not induce an interior
agreement, a contradiction.
Claim 2 For each player i, every state q ∈ Qi is visited in z(s1,s 2).
Proof. Assume the contrary - i.e., that q ∈ Qi is not visited in z(s1,s 2)
for some player i. Then, si / ∈ Bi(s1,s 2): an alternative machine s0
i, satisfying
Q0
i = Qi\{q} and τ0
i(r,a) ∈ Q0
i whenever τi(r,a)=q,i ss i m p l e rt h a nsi and
consistent with z(s1,s 2).
Claim 3 If q ∈ Qi is not a stalemate, then Aj(q) is a singleton.
Proof. Assume the contrary - i.e., q ∈ Qi is not a stalemate and yet,
there exist two periods t,k in z(s1,s 2), such that pi(t)=pi(k)=q and
a
t+1
j = C, a
k+1
j = D.L e tt0 >tbe the earliest period after t,i nw h i c hq is
visited again. Similarly, let k0 >kbe the earliest period after k,i nw h i c hq
is visited again. Consider the time interval between t and t0,a n dc o m p a r ei t
to the time interval between k and k0.
Suppose that in both time intervals, at least one player plays C.R e c a l l
that the play path is cyclic. Therefore, if the concession ratios in the two
time intervals are diﬀerent, then player j does not optimize against si,a
contradiction. On the other hand, if the concession ratios in the two time
intervals are identical, then by the NRT property, τi(q,C)=τi(q,D).B u t
in this case, playing C against i is inconsistent with best-replying to si.( I t
22could be consistent with best-replying if (s1,s 2) sustained the limit concession
ratio xi =0 . However, recall that we are focusing on interior agreements.)
It follows that in the time interval between k and k0, neither player plays
C.S i n c e q is not a stalemate, there exists a D-state r ∈ Qi, r 6= q,w h i c h
is visited in this time interval. The following machine s0
i for player i is
consistent with z(s1,s 2): Q0
i = Qi\{q}; τ0
i(r,D)=τi(q,D); τ0
i(r0,a)=r
whenever τi(r0,a)=q;o t h e r w i s e ,s0
i is identical to si.S i n c e s0
i is simpler
than si, si / ∈ Bi(s1,s 2), a contradiction.
Claim 4 If fi(q)=fi(r) and q and r are not stalemates, then Aj(q)=Aj(r).
Proof. Assume the contrary. By Claim 3, exactly one action a is played
against q and exactly one action b 6= a is played against r. Then, the following
machine s0
i for player i is consistent with z(s1,s 2): Q0
i = Qi\{q}; τ0
i(r,a)=
τi(q,a); τ0
i(r0,a 0)=r whenever τi(r0,a 0)=q;o t h e r w i s e ,s0
i is identical to si.
Since s0
i is simpler than si, si / ∈ Bi(s1,s 2), a contradiction.
Claim 5 For every player i, there exists a stalemate q ∈ Qi.
Proof. Assume the contrary - i.e., that for some player i, Qi does not
include a stalemate. By Claim 4, player j plays exactly one action b against
all D-states in Qi. By Claim 3, player j plays exactly one action a against
all C-states in Qi. By Claim 1, a 6= b.I fa = D and b = C, then it can easily
be checked that player i fails to play exactly one action against all C-states
in Qj, in contradiction to Claim 3. On the other hand, if a = C and b = D,
then every C-state in Qi which is visited in z(s1,s 2) can be reached from
every D-state in Qi which is visited in z(s1,s 2). By Claim 2, every state in
Qi is visited in z(s1,s 2). It follows that if player j’s strategy were to play
always D, he would be able to enforce the outcome xj =1 , in contradiction
to the optimality of sj against si. Thus, there exists a D-state q ∈ Qi,s u c h
that player Aj(q)={C,D}. By Claim 3, q is a stalemate.
Claim 6 Let q ∈ Qi be a stalemate. Let r ∈ Qi be a D-state, such that
τi(r,D)=q.T h e n ,D/ ∈ Aj(r).
Proof. Assume the contrary. By deﬁnition, r is not a stalemate. By
Claim 3, Aj(r)={D}. Therefore, si / ∈ Bi(s1,s 2): the following machine s0
i
for player i is simpler than si and consistent with z(s1,s 2): Q0
i = Qi\{r};
τ0
i(r0,a)=q whenever τi(r0,a)=r;o t h e r w i s e ,s0
i is identical to si.
23Deﬁnition 6 A sequence of actions (ak)k=t,...,t+K in z(s1,s 2), K ≥ 2,i s
called a D-sequence of length K if ak = D for every k = t,...,t +K −1 and
at+K = C.I fp(t) ∈ Qi,w es a yt h a tt h eD-sequence is begun by player i.I f
p(t + K) ∈ Qi, we say that the D-sequence is terminated by player i.
Claim 7 There exists a D-sequence in z(s1,s 2), which is begun and termi-
nated by the same player.
Proof. Assume the contrary. By Claim 1, at = C and at+1 = D for some
periodt.L e tp(t) ∈ Qi.B yC l a i m4 ,p l a y e rj plays only D against all C-states
in Qi. But this implies that player i always plays C and player j always plays
D in z(s1,s 2), in contradiction to Claim 1. This establishes the existence of
a D-sequence. If every D-sequence is begun and terminated by diﬀerent
players, then are a player i and two periods t,k, such that p(t),p(k) ∈ Qj,
at = ak = C and at+1 6= ak+1 - that is, player i fails to play exactly one action
against all C-states of his opponent’s machine, contradicting Claim 4.
Claim 8 si / ∈ Bi(s1,s 2) for some player i.
Proof. by Claim 7, there exists a D-sequence in z(s1,s 2).P i c k t h e
longest D-sequence and denote its length by K∗. (If there are several D-
sequences of maximal length, pick one arbitrarily.) The D-sequence is ter-
minated by some player i.L e tP ⊂ Qi be the set of D-states in Qi,w h i c h
are visited during the D-sequence, and let p0 ∈ P be the earliest state in P
to be visited in the sequence. By construction, none of the states in P are
stalemates. By Claim 4, player j plays only D against the states in P.
Let us turn to the D-sequences terminated by player j, i’s opponent.
There are two cases to consider.
Case 1. Either there exist no such sequences, or there exist such se-
quences but their maximal length is strictly below max(3,K∗).I nt h i sc a s e ,
pick an arbitrary stalemate q ∈ Qi. (Such a state exists, by Claim 5).
Case 2.T h e r ee x i s tD-sequences, which are terminated by player j,a l l
of which are of length K ≤ K∗, and some of which are exactly of length
K∗ (where K∗ ≥ 3). by Claim 7, there is a D-sequence, which is begun
and terminated by the same player, say player j. Note that during this D-
sequence, player j plays both C and D against D-states in player i’s machine.
By Claims 4 and 6, player i is in a stalemate q during the entire D-sequence.
24In both cases, the following machine s0
i is consistent with z(s1,s 2): Q0
i =
Qi\{q}; τ0
i(q0,a)=p0 whenever τi(q0,a)=q; τ0
i(p,C)=p0;o t h e r w i s e ,s0
i is
identical to si.S i n c es0
i is simpler than si, si / ∈ Bi(s1,s 2).
9.2 Proposition 3
Let (s1,s 2) be a cyclic SINE, which sustains an interior agreement. By Propo-
sition 2, (s1,s 2) violates the NRT property. It is easy to show that |Qi| > 2
for every i =1 ,2. (The proof is omitted.)
Suppose that there exists no s0
i that satisﬁes the three conditions of the
proposition. Claim 3 is the only part in the proof of Proposition 2 that
employs NRT. Hence, whenever we can show that Claim 3 holds despite
the violation of NRT, we can appropriate any other step in the proof of
Proposition 2. Suppose that Aj(q) is a singleton for every q ∈ Qi satisfying
Vj(q,C)=Vj(q,D).N o t et h a tq is not a stalemate - otherwise, Vj(q,D)=0 .
Thus, Claim 3 holds and the proof of Proposition 2 can be applied here to
show that (s1,s 2) is not a SINE. Therefore, Aj(q)={C,D} for some state
q ∈ Qi satisfying τi(q,C) 6= τi(q,D) and Vj(q,C)=Vj(q,D).( H e n c e , q is
not a stalemate.)
Since (s1,s 2) is cyclic and every state in Qi is visited in z(s1,s 2),e v e r y
two states q,r ∈ Qi can be reached from each other. Order the states in
Qi as follows: Qi = {q1,...,qn}, n =| Qi |, such that for every k =1 ,...,n
there exists an action ak ∈ Aj(q), such that τi(qk,a k)=qk+1modn.A s
we saw earlier, Qi contains a state qk which is not a stalemate, for which
Aj(qk)={C,D}. Thus, there exist an action bk 6= ak and another state
qk+m(k) ∈ Qi, m(k) 6=1 , such that qk+m(k) = τi(qk,b k).L e tQK ⊂ Qi be the
set of all such states qk.D e n o t eQL = Qi − QK.
Suppose that player j deviates to a machine s0
j, which plays only bk against
every state qk ∈ QK and only al against every state ql ∈ QL.I f , a s a
consequence of this deviation, a subset Q∗ ⊂ Qi consisting of at least two
states becomes unvisited in z(si,s 0
j), then the following machine s0
i is simpler
than si and consistent with z(si,s 0
j): Q0
i =( Qi − Q∗) ∪ {q∗}, fi(q∗)=D,
τ0
i(q∗,·)=q∗, τ0
i(qk,a k)=q∗ for every qk ∈ QK, τ0
i(ql,a)=q∗ when a 6= al
for every ql ∈ Ql; and otherwise s0
i is identical to si.I n o t h e r w o r d s , s0
i
substitutes a single “grim” state for the states that become unvisited as a
result of the deviation. (For example, suppose that the structure of sj is
given by Figure 6 and that D ∈ Ai(q).I fp l a y e ri deviates to a strategy that
always plays C against q, he renders three states in Qj unvisited. Therefore,
25his justiﬁcation of his behavior can rely on an alternative belief s0
j,w h i c h
substitutes a single “grim” state for these three states.) Note that s0
j is a
best-reply to s0
i. Hence, the deviation to s0
j satisﬁes the three conditions of






It follows that QK consists of a single element qk, such that m(k)=2 .
(Since n>2, m(k)modn 6= k.) This also means that qk is the only state
that qk+1 is connected to - i.e., there exists no other state qh ∈ Qi,f o rw h i c h
τi(qh,a)=qk+1 for some action a ∈ {C,D}.
Suppose that ak = C, bk = D. Consider the deviation of player j to
a machine s0
j, which plays only D against qk and only al against every
other state ql.B y c o n s t r u c t i o n , s0
j is a best-reply to si.M o r e o v e r , t h e
following machine s0




i(qk,a)=qk+2 for every a ∈ {C,D}; and otherwise,
s0
i is identical to si.N o t et h a ts0
j is a best-reply to s0
i. Hence, the deviation to
s0
j satisﬁes the three conditions of the proposition, a contradiction. It follows
that ak = D, bk = C.
Claim 9 qk+1 is a stalemate and fi(qk)=C.
Proof. Suppose that ak+1 = D. Then, it is possible for player j to make
player i’s machine switch from qk to qk+2 by playing only D against qk and
qk+1, in contradiction to the optimality of playing C against qk.( R e c a l lt h a t
Vj(qk,a k)=Vj(qk,b k).T h u s ,ak+1 = C. Now, suppose that fi(qk+1)=C.I f
player j plays C against qk,p l a y e ri’s machine switches immediately to qk+2.
26On the other hand, if player j plays D against qk, he can do no better than
play C against qk+1 (since ak+1 = C), and player i’s machine will switch to
qk+2.I nb o t hc a s e sp l a y e rj makes one concession during the move from qk
to qk+2,b u ti nt h el a t t e rc a s eh ea l s om a n a g e st os q u e e z eac o n c e s s i o nf r o m
player i. Therefore, Vj(qk,D) >V j(qk,C), a contradiction. Thus, we have
established that ak+1 = C and fi(qk+1)=D.
We have already shown that qk is the only state q ∈ Qi which is not a
stalemate, for which τi(q,C) 6= τi(q,D).I fτi(qk+1,D)=τi(qk+1,C)=qk+2,
then C/ ∈ argmaxV (qk+1,·), contradicting the fact that ak+1 = C.T h u s ,t h e
only remaining possibility is that qk+1 is a stalemate.
Suppose that fi(qk)=D. Then, the following machine s0
i for player
i is consistent with z(s1,s 2): Q0
i = Qi − {qk}; τ0
i(r,a)=qk+1 whenever
τi(r,a)=qk; τ0
i(qk+1,D)=qk+1;o t h e r w i s e ,s0
i is identical to si. Therefore,
si / ∈ Bi(s1,s 2),ac o n t r a d i c t i o n .
Let us summarize what we have established so far. If there exists a
state qk ∈ Qi which is not a stalemate such that Aj(qk)={C,D},t h e n :
fi(qk)=C; qk+1 is a stalemate; ak = D, ak+1 = C; qk is the only state from
which there is a transition into qk+1;a n dqk is the only state in Qi that has
a non-constant yet is not a stalemate.
Claim 10 Each player’s machine contains a stalemate.
Proof. Suppose that Qi does not contain a stalemate. Then, Qi must
contain a cycle of D-states: i.e., a subset of states ¯ Q, through which player
i’s machine would cycle if player j played only D against them. Otherwise,
player j would be able to play only D against si and attain xj =1 ,a
contradiction. Recall the way in which we ordered the states in Q from q1
through qn.N o t e t h a t ql / ∈ ¯ Q. There must exist a state ql ∈ ¯ Q,f o rw h i c h
al = C and bl = D - otherwise, the play path would not sustain an interior
agreement. But this contradicts our previous assertion that qk is the only
state in Qi that has a non-constant transition yet is not a stalemate.
Claim 11 There is a D-sequence that is begun and terminated by the same
player.
Proof. We saw earlier that qk+1 is connected only to qk.S i n c eqk is visited
in z(s1,s 2), there exists a period t,s u c ht h a tp(t)=qk and p(t +2 )=qk+1.
27Because qk+1 is a stalemate, player j eventually plays C against qk+1 at some
period t0 >t+2 .T h u s , t h e r e e x i s t s a D-sequence, which is begun and
terminated by player j.
Claim 12 Players play exactly one action against any D-state which is not
as t a l e m a t e .
Proof. We have seen that if q ∈ Qi is not a stalemate and player j plays
both C and D against q,t h e nq is a C-state.
The last three claims allow us to apply Claim 8 in the proof of Proposition
2. It follows that (s1,s 2) is not a SINE, a contradiction.
9.3 Proposition 4
Let (s1,s 2) be a SINE with linear machines, which sustains an interior agree-
ment. It is easy to see that Claims 1 and 2 hold, irrespective of whether the
concession game’s horizon is ﬁnite or inﬁnite. Let us now show that Aj(q)
is a singleton whenever q is not a stalemate. This would reproduce Claim 3
for the ﬁnite-horizon game with linear equilibrium machines, and we would
be able to appropriate Claims 4-8 as well.
Suppose that Aj(q)={C,D} against some state q ∈ Qi, which is not
a stalemate. For every player i, the last state ri to be visited in z(s1,s 2)
satisﬁes τj(ri,·)=ri. Otherwise, by the linearity of equilibrium machines,
there exists a state in one of the player’s machines, which is not visited in
z(s1,s 2), in contradiction to Claim 2. W.l.o.g., f1(r1)=C and f2(r2)=D.
Suppose that player 2 deviated to a strategy that plays only D against
any state in Q1 which is not a stalemate, and plays C against any stalemate
in Q1. Due to the linearity of s1, the deviation would strictly reduce the
total number of concessions that player 1 makes. Since player 1’s machine
has an absorbing C-state which is reached as a result of the deviation, the
game will terminate in agreement. Therefore, this is a proﬁtable deviation
for player 2, a contradiction. We have thus established Claim 3. The rest of
the proof of Proposition 2 can be applied.
28